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DECISION MAKING FOR CHILDREN
WITH LIFE-LIMITING ILLNESSES:
A CLINICAL APPROACH
YORAM UNGURU, MD, MS, MA*
CASE STUDY
Michael, a fifteen-year-old with metastatic osteosarcoma, has not responded
to conventional therapy. For almost one year, he was treated in a therapeutic,
randomized clinical trial, which consisted of standard therapy (up-front
chemotherapy, limb salvage surgery, and postsurgical chemotherapy). When his
cancer responded poorly to up-front therapy, he was randomized to receive
additional "experimental" chemotherapy.
Michael has a very close relationship with his mother, and he has been an
active participant in every treatment conference. For the most part, Michael
tolerated the treatment; however, he struggled both physically and emotionally with
the last three months of treatment. Michael's end-of-therapy scans confirmed that
the tumor was still present in both the bone and the lungs.
Michael's mother wants to proceed with an (unproven) experimental therapy
in an effort to prolong his life. Michael, on the other hand, does not desire this
intervention. Michael asks the physician not to administer the drug and to allow
him to die on his "own terms." Michael's mother (emphatically) states that this is
her decision to make and not his. She adds that if the physician is not willing to
treat him, she will take him to a doctor who will.
This case raises many important questions. For example, as Michael's
physician, are you comfortable with the decision he is asking you to allow him to
make? How do you balance Michael's goals with those of his mother's and your
own? How can you (or should you) find a way to enable Michael's mother to allow
him to transition into control of his own health care management? Who ultimately
is responsible for Michael's care and health? Should the fact that the treatment in
question is considered experimental make a difference?
Copyright 0 2012 by Yoram Unguru.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Medical decision making involving older children requires the physician to
obtain both the patient's assent and parental permission.2 Pediatricians are ideally
positioned to deal with the inevitable conflicts inherent in these situations as
exemplified in the case study above.3 In order to address the questions that this case
study presents, this article will first explore the decision making capacity of
children 4 and explain the concept of assent as related to a minor's decisions
regarding his or her treatment regimen.5 Next, the article will discuss recent
research, which demonstrates the need for direct communication between parents,
physicians, and children.6 Lastly, this article will conclude with recommendations
for a practical decision-making model and a discussion of the case study presented
above.7
II. DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY AND ASSENT
By definition, "children constitute a vulnerable population."8 The
vulnerability of children relates directly to their limited decision-making capacity
(i.e., the ability to make reasonable decisions). 9 Thus, because many children,
especially infants and young children, lack decision-making capacity to make
informed and voluntary decisions, they are deemed vulnerable and merit special
protections.' 0 Older children and adolescents, however, often possess the capacity
for decision making and therefore may be qualified to make select decisions while
unable to make others." It is usually the pediatrician's role to determine if a child
2. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.407 (2010) (establishing that a physician must solicit a child's assent
and a parent's permission for a child to participate in a clinical research study); see also Comm. on
Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS
314, 317 (1995) (noting that, in addition to obtaining parental permission, physicians should, in most
cases, obtain patient assent as well).
3. See generally Symposium Case Studies, supra note 1.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.A-D.
6. See infra Part Ill.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Wilma C. Rossi et al., Child Assent and Parental Permission in Pediatric Research, 24
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 131, 131 (2003).
9. See id. at 135 36 (noting that children less than seven-years-old are considered incapable of
providing assent, and among children aged seven to fourteen,, assent can be easily compromised by the
power relationship between parents and children).
10. See Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of
Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 149-50 (2000) (noting the belief that children lack
the "maturity, experience, and capacity" necessary to make difficult decisions and are therefore
incapable of making medical decisions and need to be protected from themselves).
I1. See CHILDREN'S ONCOLOGY GRP., ASSENT TASK FORCE, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLVING
CHILDREN IN DECISION-MAKING ABOUT RESEARCH PARTICIPATION 1, 4, 7, available at
http://www.pediatricethics.com/documents/policies/Decisions Oncology.pdf [hereinafter COG TASK
FORCE GUIDELINES] (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (explaining that for decisions related to research
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or adolescent has the ability to make a given decision.12 Thus, it is appropriate and
ethically justifiable to solicit assent from children who are unable to make
autonomous choices.' 3
Assent refers to the active agreement of a minor to participate in a diagnostic
or treatment regimen.14 The ethical principle of pediatric assent recognizes that
children (especially adolescents) are capable of participating at some level in
decision making related to their care.' 5 The assent requirement seeks to respect
children as individuals with emerging autonomy.16 Above all else, assent is about
respecting a child's "developing capacity,"' 7 assisting the child in understanding
his condition and treatment at a developmentally appropriate level, 8 and involving
him in appropriate decision-making tasks. '9
Meaningful assent requires an appreciation of the child's developmental stage
and recognition of his basic preferences.20 A child should be included in medical
decisions to the extent that he or she is able to and wants to be involved.2 1 Parents
and physicians need to encourage children to communicate openly so that children
may be active participants in the assent process. 22 Shared decision making
empowers children to the extent of their capacity. 23
participation, children fourteen years of age and older may potentially reach the decision-making
capacity of many adults).
12. See Tara L. Kuther, Medical Decision-Making and Minors: Issues of Consent and Assent, 38
ADOLESCENCE 343, 345 (2003) (noting that physicians are largely responsible for determining whether a
minor has the capacity to consent to specific treatment based partly on the minor's comprehension of the
procedure and the possible outcomes).
13. Id at 351 (describing that minors may not be capable of autonomous decision making in all
circumstances, but that it is still appropriate to involve them in the decision-making process).
14. Id
15. Id.
16. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, No. (OS) 77-0004, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 71, 72 (1977) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
17. William G. Bartholome, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Research, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: FACING THE 2 1STCENTURY 339, 358 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed., 1996).
18. Id. at 360.
19. Id. at 360-61.
20. See id. (noting that the multiple elements of assent recognize the child's developmental
maturity and inclinations).
21. Yoram Unguru et al., Rethinking Pediatric Assent: From Requirement to Ideal, 55 PEDIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 211, 217 (2008).
22. Id at 217-18.
23. See Gail Geller et al., Informed Consent for Enrolling Minors in Genetic Susceptibility
Research: A Qualitative Study of At-risk Children's and Parents' Views About Children's Role in
Decision-Making, 32 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 260, 269 (2003) (noting the positive impact that shared
decision making had on children).
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Like other areas of child development, capacity for decision making occurs
along a spectrum and evolves with time and experience. 24 Factors influencing this
process include a child's maturity level, ability to reason and consider the impact of
their decision, including relevant alternatives and consequences, and prior decision-
making experience. 25 With regard to the latter, one might imagine two children of
the same age, Jane and Joe. Consistently throughout her life, Jane's parents have
allowed her to participate in and to make decisions. As Jane has demonstrated an
appreciation for and gained experience with the decision-making process, her
parents have gradually allowed her to participate in and make more substantive
decisions. Joe's parents have adopted a different approach. They have allowed him
to make routine choices but have not given him the chance to participate in making
significant life-decisions, preferring instead to make such decisions on his behalf.
As one might sunmise, Jane is seemingly better prepared to appreciate and to
understand the nuances of medical decision making than Joe, who has been
insulated from making life-decisions and who may be less equipped to participate
meaningfully in and to assent to medical (and research) decisions.2 6 Accordingly,
no two children attain decision-making capacity similarly.2 7
As recognized in common law, minors possess varying degrees of decision-
making capacity. 28 The rule of capacity, also known as the Rule of Sevens, is
strictly an age-based criterion. 29 Accordingly, minors under seven years of age have
no such capacity; minors "between seven and fourteen have a rebuttable
presumption of no capacity"; and minors "between fourteen and twenty-one, have a
rebuttable presumption of capacity." 30 Evidence from the social sciences supports
the notion that, in general, children fourteen and older appear to be as competent as
adults in making informed treatment decisions.3 ' As the example of Jane and Joe
illustrates, age alone, however, is not an adequate indicator of a child's ability to
understand. 32
24. Mary Ann McCabe, Involving Children and Adolescents in Medical Decision Making:
Developmental and Clinical Considerations, 21 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 505, 508 (1996).
25. Id. at 509-10, 513.
26. Id. at 511 (explaining that family factors may determine a child's level of involvement in the
decision-making process).
27. Id. at 509.
28. Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744-45 (Tenn. 1987) (noting the common law
recognition of varying degrees of decision-making capacity in minors).
29. Id. at 745.
30. Id.
31. Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982).
32. See Rossi et al., supra note 8, at 132 (noting that age, maturity, and psychological state are all
factors that should be considered when determining a minor's capacity); see also Robert Bennett,
Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L.




In pediatric medicine, shared decision making is a worthy and valuable
standard. Shared decision making strives to respect both parents' and children's
preferences and values while meeting the goals of medicine. 33 Typically, parents
and children share similar ideals and more often than not, in medical situations, the
two align with one another.34 However, disagreements do occasionally occur and
this has clear implications for assent. 35 Every effort should be made to secure a
child's readiness to accept treatment, but as recognized in the law, it is the parents,
not the child, who are the ultimate arbiters of decision making.36 Accordingly,
parents may compel their child to accept a treatment, so long as that treatment is in
a child's best interest.37 In other words, parental permission may trump a child's
assent.38 The principle of respecting a child as a developing person requires that
physicians inform the child that while they value his or her opinion, in specific
instances his opinion may be overridden. 39 Failure to do so has the potential for
damaging the child's developing self as well as the trusting relationship between
the child, his parents, and the physician.40
B. Determining the Validity of a Child's Decision
For a medical decision to be valid, it must be voluntary and informed.41
Decisional capacity matures along a continuum dependent on time and
experience;42 as such, children possess varying degrees of decision-making
capacity, which is determined primarily by the type of decision and the risks and
benefits involved.43 The threshold level of capacity is a useful model to assist in
determining if a particular child may make a given decision. 44 For high-risk
33. See Geller et al., supra note 23, at 269 (noting that both children and parents value shared
medical decision making).
34. See COG TASK FORCE GUIDELINES, supra note I1, at 7 (recognizing that fundamental
disagreements between parents and children, with regard to research participation, are rare).
35. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 354-55 (describing the ways in which disagreements occur and
how to proceed despite the disagreement of the parties).
36. Id. at 344, 356.
37. Id. at 344.
38. Id. at 344, 355-56.
39. Id. at 352-53 (noting that physicians should always be up-front with minor patients about how
the patient's values and preferences will be incorporated into the decision-making process).
40. See Francoise Baylis et al., Children and Decisionmaking in Health Research, 21 IRB, July-
Aug. 1999, at 5, 8 (stating that children may be "seriously harmed by having something done to them
without their knowledge or understanding").
41. Kuther, supra note 12, at 344.
42. McCabe, supra note 24, at 507-10.
43. Id. at 509-10 (describing the varying levels of situations and factors that influence a minor's
capacity to make competent decisions).
44. See Alex Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment, 97 J.
ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 415,416,418 (2004) (defining a threshold level of capacity).
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decisions (e.g., refusal of a life-saving intervention), a higher threshold of decision-
making capacity is necessary; for low-risk decisions (e.g., choosing between two
equally efficacious medications), a lower threshold is appropriate. 45
Historically, assessment of decision-making capacity has focused on
understanding, an important component of decision-making capacity. 46 Yet, in
practice, evaluating understanding is a difficult task. 47 Part of the problem relates to
the definition of understanding, which is multidimensional (i.e., elements of
understanding include, but are not limited to, comprehension, knowledge, and
awareness). 48 Additionally, few validated tools exist for assessing understanding,
and most are designed for adults, not children.49 What is clear is that three factors
must exist for a child to possess decision-making capacity: (1) a child's choice
must be voluntary; (2) his or her choice must be both reasonable and rational; and
(3) the child must understand information that is relevant to his choice.o Although
evaluating a child's understanding remains an essential element of assent, it alone
is insufficient in assuring that assent is significant and meaningful.5' As appreciated
by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the process of obtaining a child's
assent requires several steps: 52 the physician must (1) help the patient achieve
awareness of his or her condition; (2) tell the patient what he or she can expect
regarding diagnosis and treatment; (3) assess the patient's understanding; (4) assess
factors influencing patient responses (i.e., undue pressure); and (5) solicit the
patient's willingness to accept care.53
45. Cf Kuther, supra note 12, at 354 (opining that a physician should respect a minor's decision
with regard to elective treatments but "probe further" where a minor is refusing treatment with benefits
that outweigh the risks).
46. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects, Research Involving Children: Report and
Recommendations of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 2084, 2098 (Jan. 13, 1978) (emphasizing that pediatric researchers
should make sure minors of a certain age have the requisite understanding about their involvement).
47. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 346 (noting that there is a lack of clear guidelines in determining a
minor's maturity or decision-making capacity).
48. WEBSTER'S 11: NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1202 (2001).
49. Cf Buchanan, supra note 44, at 415-16 (applying the threshold level of capacity theory to adult
patients); Cathy Charles et al., Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What Does It Mean?
(or It Takes at Least Two to Tango), 44 SOc. SCi. & MED. 681, 682 (1997) (applying shared decision-
making theory to adult decision making with regard to medical treatment).
50. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 344.
51. See Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 315-16 (outlining the multiple elements required for





C. Societal and Legal Attitudes Towards Assent
Sufficient evidence supports a role for children's involvement in decisions
related to their care and research involvement. 54 In addition to promoting a child's
developing sense of autonomy and personal responsibility, participation in decision
making may in fact improve a child's response to treatment.55 Nevertheless, there is
reluctance on the part of legal institutions and the public at large to include children
in certain treatment- and research-related decisions. 56
Part of this reluctance concerns the potential for child-parent conflict as it
relates to the appropriate moral weight to assign to children's assent or dissent.57 As
appreciated by Baylis and colleagues, 58 this is particularly germane to children's
involvement in research settings,59 yet it is relevant in the clinical arena as well.60 If
a child's decisions carry the same power as the decisions of his parents, then from a
moral and ethical perspective the child may veto the parents' decision if and when
he disagrees about research involvement or a particular clinical decision.6' Purely
from an enforcement perspective, the difficulty with this scenario is primarily a
legal one. 62 While morally a child's decisions may be no different from those of his
parents, the difficult question that arises in such a situation is: should the decisions
of a child who lacks legal standing be as authoritative as those of his parents? 63
Baylis et al. argue that concepts of assent (for research), which rely on decisional
authority, are too narrow and instead need to be expanded in its focus and consider
to what extent a child may participate as "assenter or dissenter." 64 Thus, a child
54. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 348-50 (showing that adolescents and adults have similar
decision-making capacities for certain types of decisions).
55. Cf Rochelle T. Bastien & Howard S. Adelman, Noncompulsory Versus Legally Mandated
Placement, Perceived Choice, and Response to Treatment Among Adolescents, 52 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 172 (1984) (citing a study on an elderly population which demonstrated that
those seniors who had control over their decisions were happier and healthier than those who did not
have any control).
56. Baylis et al., supra note 40, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5.
59. See generally id (discussing the involvement of children in the research decision-making
process).
60. Christine A. Zawistowski & Joel E. Frader, Ethical Problems in Pediatric Critical Care:
Consent, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. S407, S408 (2003) (applying assent requirements to pediatric clinical
care).
61. See Baylis et al., supra note 40, at 6 (noting the difficulty in determining the amount of
decision-making power that children should have in the medical setting).
62. Id. at 9 (discussing that parents are entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions on
behalf of their children because it is believed that they will act in the child's best interests, and if not,
can sometimes suffer legal repercussions).
63. See id. at 8 (establishing the difficulty in determining when children have the necessary
capacity to make decisions for themselves).
64. Id. at 8.
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may still have a valuable contribution even if he lacks decisional authority. 65 Baylis
et al. describe this as a "receptive role" rather than a "decisional role." 66
D. Assent to Research as Compared to Clinical Care
Assent for research differs from assent for clinical care.67 For assent to be
truly meaningful, an understanding of the difference between the two is imperative.
Clinical care (i.e., treatment) focuses on an individual patient.68 It employs
recommended treatments-the benefits of which are assumed to outweigh the
risks. 69 Clinical research, on the other hand, seeks to provide generalizable
knowledge with the potential for benefiting future patients (and may not offer
benefit to the participant at all). 70 Therefore, while clinical care is grounded in
promoting a patient's best interests, clinical research does not share this goal;
instead, it employs subjects as a means to an end.71 Appreciating this difference in
the purposes of clinical care and research is extremely important.72 Thus, before a
child (or adult) assents to research participation, he must understand the underlying
purpose of the research protocol and that it may hold no direct benefit to him, or
may even harm him. 73 Hence, assent or consent to research demands a more
nuanced and refined decisional capacity than assent and consent to clinical
treatment.74
65. See id. (referencing a child's ability to participate without actually having the final decision-
making authority).
66. Id.
67. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(b) (2010) ("Assent means a child's affirmative agreement to
participate in research. Mere failure to object should not, absent affirmative agreement, be construed as
assent."), and § 46.408(a) ("[T]he IRB shall determine that adequate provisions are made for soliciting
the assent of the children, when in the judgment of the IRB the children are capable of providing
assent."), with Kuther, supra note 12, at 351 (describing assent as it pertains to the medical treatment of
minors as "an interactive process between a minor and a physician that involves developmentally
appropriate disclosure about the illness and solicitation of the minor's willingness and preferences
regarding treatment").
68. Paul Litton & Franklin G. Miller, A Normative Justification for Distinguishing the Ethics oJ
Clinical Research from the Ethics of Medical Care, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 566, 566 (2005).
69. Id.
70. Charles W. Lidz et al., Competing Commitments in Clinical Trials, 31 IRB, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at
1, 1.
71. Gail E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic
Misconception, 4 PLOS MED. 1735, 1736 (2007) ("[l]t is a misconception to believe that the purpose of
clinical trials is to administer treatment rather than to conduct research").
72. Id.
73. Sanford Leikin, Minors'Assent, Consent, or Dissent to Medical Research, 15 IRB, Mar.-Apr.
1993, at 1, 5; Lauren K. Collogan & Alan R. Fleischman, Adolescent Research and Parental
Permission, in ETHICS & RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 77, 87 (Eric Kodish
ed., 2005).
74. Collogan & Fleischman, supra note 73, at 87 (noting that informed consent is different for
clinical treatment situations and clinical research).
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III. FINDING A BALANCE
The need for direct communication between parents, physicians, and children
with life-limiting illnesses is increasingly apparent.75 This communication includes
discussions relating to prognosis and even death.76 Hinds and colleagues found that
children with life-limiting cancer between ages ten and twenty were capable of
participating in end-of-life decision making.77 Children typically want to be
involved in decisions that concern their bodies and health.78 They also generally
recognize their role in decision-making as intertwined with that of their parents and
appreciate and respect their parents' input,79 particularly when they perceive a
situation to be more risky.80 Most children do not expect to make decisions on their
own but wish to be involved in the process and have their opinions respected.8 '
Shared decision making enables children to clarify their own values and
preferences. 82 Assent should not be viewed as a challenge to parental authority and
parental decision making.83 Assent and parental permission are not mutually
exclusive; instead, the two complement one another and result in a more
collaborative and substantive shared decision-making model. 84 As appreciated by
the AAP, meaningful assent is best viewed as a process wherein children, parents,
and physicians participate in joint decision making.85 Importantly, this process is
individualized based on the unique capabilities of the child.86
75. CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, UNIV. OF MINN., END OF LIFE CARE: AN ETHICAL OVERVIEw 48 (2005)
(discussing the importance of involving a dying child in treatment and health care discussions).
76. Comm. on Bioethics & Comm. on Hosp. Care, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Palliative Care for
Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 351, 353 (2000); Bruce P. Himelstein et al., Pediatric Palliative Care, 350
NEW ENO. J. MED. 1752, 1753, 1756 tbl.3 (2004) (discussing how to communicate with children facing
life-threatening illnesses); see generally Javier R. Kane et al., Understanding the Illness Experience and
Providing Anticipatory Guidance, in TEXTBOOK OF INTERDISCIPLINARY PEDIATRIC PALLIATIVE CARE
30, 30 (Joanne Wolfe et al. eds., 2011) (noting the importance of communication between a physician
and the family members of a child with a life-threatening illness).
77. Pamela S. Hinds et al., End-of-Life Care Preferences of Pediatric Patients with Cancer, 23 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 9146, 9153 (2005).
78. See, e.g., Geller et al., supra note 23, at 264 (noting that children generally felt it was their
decision of whether to participate in genetic research).
79. Rossi et al., supra note 8, at 139; see also Geller et al., supra note 23, at 264; Yoram Unguru et
al., The Experiences of Children Enrolled in Pediatric Oncology Research: Implications for Assent, 125
PEDIATRICS e876, e880 (2010).
80. Geller et al., supra note 23, at 265-66.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Cf Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 315 (noting that while advocating the solicitation of
assent from a child, practitioners still need the "informed permission" from the parents for medical
interventions).
84. See Geller et al., supra note 23, at 269 (arguing that a shared-decision process, which includes
both children and parents, can enhance cooperation).
85. Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 315.
86. Baylis et al., supra note 40, at 7 (describing the four criteria for making an individualized
assessment of a child's decision-making capacity in research participation).
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Mack and colleagues surveyed parents of children with cancer and found that
parents rated the quality of care provided by physicians more favorably when
physicians communicated directly with their children (when appropriate)8 7
Similarly, in a survey of over 400 Swedish parents of children who died of cancer,
Kreicbergs et al. found that none of the parents who spoke with their child about
death regretted doing so, whereas more than one quarter of parents who did not
speak with their child regretted not doing so." The latter parent group had higher
levels of anxiety and depression than parents who spoke to their children.8 9
Parents are not alone in valuing the importance of direct communication
between children and physicians. 90 Recent research has shown that children with
cancer consider direct communication between doctors and children more
important than any other aspect of improving adolescent decision making.9' Nearly
forty years ago, following parental approval, Nitschke et al., began including
children with cancer, ages five and older, who were near death, in end-of-life
discussions. 92 They found that the majority of children and parents found the
child's inclusion a positive experience.93 They also reported that some children
from whom information was withheld experienced fear and isolation prior to
dying. 94
Pediatricians are in a unique position to help children and parents with
appreciating and developing their own practical approach to shared decision
making. When a child is ill, parents seek to protect and to isolate their child from
harms. Many parents perceive decision making itself as burdensome and in an
effort to shield their child, assume full decision-making responsibility. 95 Clinicians
need to be aware of this phenomenon. As a trusted caretaker, pediatricians can, and
87. Jennifer W. Mack et al., Parent and Physician Perspectives on Quality of Care at the End of
Life in Children with Cancer, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 9155, 9159 (2005).
88. Ulrika Kreicbergs et al., Talking About Death with Children Who Have Severe Malignant
Disease, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1175, 1177 (2004).
89. Id. at 184.
90. CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, UNIV. OF MINN., supra note 75, at 48.
91. See Unguru et al., supra note 79, at e880 (advancing a study on children with cancer about their
understanding of research and treatment, which demonstrated that 39% of those children surveyed
wanted more discussions directly with doctors); see also Mack et al., supra note 87, at 9160 (noting the
importance of communication with children, especially near the end of their life).
92. Ruprecht Nitschke et al., Perspective: Care of Terminally /// Children with Cancer, 34 MED. &
PEDIATRIC ONCOLOGY 268, 268 (2000).
93. See id. at 269 (stating that regardless of the child's therapeutic choice, fewer than one-third of
the children reacted with sadness, anxiety and anger when included in the final stage conference to
discuss their unresponsiveness to further therapy).
94. Id
95. See McCabe, supra note 24, at 511-12 (explaining how a decision-making situation may be
difficult and burdensome for a child); Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Inforned Consent
Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIs. L.
REV. 413, 423 (1979) (stating that, in general, family and friends are interested in a loved one's medical
decision because of the desire to relieve the patient's pain and suffering).
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should, help parents develop the skills to allow their children to think
independently. 96 Children, especially ill children, need to know that they can
depend on their parents to support them as they learn to make appropriate
decisions. 97 Including children in decision making empowers children. It provides
them with a sense of purpose and control and promotes improved future choices. 98
Collaborative decision making does not require that children's, parents', and
physician's decisions carry equal weight.99 Rather, all parties should be able to
respectfully state their desires and concerns. 00 Thus, parents should allow children
to speak freely; they must honestly and thoughtfully listen to and acknowledge
what their child has to say.'01 Children need to know that while their preferences
will be heard and considered, decision making is a joint endeavor, and ultimately,
their decision may be overturned.102 As the child's advocate, pediatricians are
ideally situated to serve as a bridge between the child and his parents, easing some
of the burden, mediating disagreements, and assisting both sides in reaching a
reasonable decision-one that is acceptable to all stakeholders.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PRACTICAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL
As appreciated by others, a tangible model of assent gives choices to children
of all ages.103 The type and extent of acceptable choices are unique to each child
and contingent upon the child's maturity level, history of decision making, and
96. Cf COMM. ON PALLIATIVE & END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, INST. OF
MED., WHEN CHILDREN DIE: IMPROVING PALLIATIVE AND END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND
THEIR FAMILIES 129 (Marilyn J. Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2003) (describing that the entire
palliative care team, including, doctors, nurses, consultants and chaplains, can help families reach their
goals).
97. See Bartholome, supra note 17, at 358 (noting the general fragility of children and the need for
encouragement and reinforcement by parents in the context of giving medical consent).
98. See Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 315 (stating that including children in medical
decision making empowers the child and can "improve long-term health outcomes").
99. See McCabe, supra note 24, at 508-09 (noting the varying levels of child, parent and caregiver
involvement in medical decision making).
100. See Geller et al., supra note 23, at 269 (discussing the importance of shared decision making
between parents and children which inherently involves both parties voicing their opinions); see also
Myra Bluebond-Langer et al., "I Want to Live, Until I don't Want to Live Anymore ": Involving Children
with Life-Threatening and Life-Shortening Illnesses in Decision Making About Care and Treatment, 45
NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 329, 336-40 (2010) (discussing the issues that must be considered when
involving children in medical decision making as well as suggesting an approach for involving
children).
101. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 351-52 (noting the importance of including minors in discussions
about their medical treatment).
102. Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 315-16.
103. Nancy M. P. King & Alan W. Cross, Children as Decision Makers: Guidelines for
Pediatricians, 115 J. PEDIATRICS 10, I1, 15 (1989) (arguing that children of all ages can participate at
some level of the decision-making process).
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familial values.104 As children gain an appreciation for and awareness of the
decision-making process, they should be granted greater responsibility and allowed
a higher threshold for decision making. 05
Applying this model to the case study presented at the beginning of this
article, Michael, as a fifteen-year-old, is sufficiently mature to understand the issues
related to his treatment and to participate in decision making. His experience with
his disease and past treatment regimens has also resulted in a level of maturity that
exceeds his age. Michael understands the nature of the proposed treatment,
including its risks and expected benefits. He has voiced the opinion that he does not
wish to proceed with an experimental regimen, an opinion not shared by his
mother. Given his level of maturity, failure to respect his wishes, especially
regarding an experimental treatment regimen that is unlikely to significantly alter
the course of his illness, would be profoundly disrespectful and potentially harmful.
Ignoring his wishes may also lead to feelings of isolation and distress. 106
Situations like Michael's do not lend themselves to easy solutions. By helping
to facilitate, clarify, and resolve areas of contention, pediatricians can be extremely
helpful. 0 7 The challenge for pediatricians is to do so in a way that is both sensitive
and respectful of the conflicting needs of the child, parents, and providers.i0 In
many cases, simply providing a space where Michael and his mother can speak
freely about their choices and the reasons for those choices will lead to a solution
that is acceptable to both. Michael needs his mother to hear what he is saying, and
the physician's role in this case is not simply to override his desires but to facilitate
the opportunity for his mother to understand what he needs in this difficult
situation.
104. See id. at 12, 13 (stating that when determining a child's capacity to make decisions, physicians
and parents should examine several factors, including age, intellect, past decisions, and familial values).
105. Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 2, at 316.
106. Bartholome, supra note 17, at 358.
107. See Kuther, supra note 12, at 343 ("The information provided by physicians about illness and
treatment options is vital to patients' decision making and influences their psychological well-being.").
108. See King & Cross, supra note 103, at 16 (arguing that it is important for physicians to recognize
and balance the conflicting needs of the child-patient and parents).
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